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Abstract
It is well documented that the possibility of punishing free-riders increases contributions in
one-shot public good games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment
commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high contribution levels. Thus, almost
selfish players may behave as strong reciprocators.
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1 Introduction
Experimental evidence suggests that people increase their contributions to a public good
substantially when the possibility of punishing free-riders is introduced (e.g. Fehr and Ga¨chter,
2000a, 2002; Yamagishi, 1986). Since costly punishment is not subgame perfect, this evidence
is often interpreted as another blow to the concept of homo oeconomicus and as evidence
supporting strong reciprocity theory. Indeed, some deviation from the homo oeconomicus
assumptions is needed to explain the (strong) consequences of the possibility to punish. This
deviation is typically interpreted as emotions, particularly anger, in the reciprocity literature
(e.g. Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002). Below, I theoretically demonstrate that only traces of anger
are needed to explain the well-documented high contribution levels; the deviation thus needs
to be rather small. This short note is an instance of a more general program: small deviations
from the homo oeconomicus framework explain many large behavioral anomalies documented
in behavioral experiments, see Binmore (2006) and Binmore and Swierzbinski (2006).
The model under study reflects the standard experimental design of public good games
with punishment option: N players have a possibility to contribute to a linear public good.
All players are thereafter given the opportunity to allocate punishment points to other players,
which is costly for both sides.
Though I assume that the punishment activity is motivated by emotions such as anger,
it is not the purpose of this note to explain where emotions come from.1 The focus is on the
intensity of emotions that it takes to enable the players to cooperate, where the intensity is
measured by an amount of money the players spend on punishment. I choose a black box
approach, and model punishment as an automatic reaction fully governed by a punishment
rule, which is a function of the realized contributions.
Below I construct a punishment rule which induces a game with unique equilibrium in
which all players make high contributions. The rule requires every player to punish only the
player with the lowest contribution which in turn motivates her to escape the lowest position.
The game with such a punishment rule can be solved by iterated elimination of dominated
strategies because the lowest non-eliminated contribution level is always dominated by the
level just above it. At the same time, it is possible to implement such a punishment rule at
minimal cost because resources from a large group of players are focused on one free-rider. The
rule resembles the rule experimentally implemented by Yamagishi (1986). I do not argue that
this exact punishment rule is necessarily used in reality; I simply show that a rule inducing
high contributions exists.
1People may punish a bit because of warm glow (e.g. Andreoni, 1990), altruism (e.g. Andreoni and Miller,
2002), inequality aversion (e.g. Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000;), or reciprocity (e.g. Levine, 1998). The Role of
emotions as a commitment device was stressed by Frank (1988). There is neuroscientific evidence suggesting
that emotions such as anger are triggered by unfair behavior (de Quervain et al., 2004).
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2 The Model
Each player i ∈ {1, . . . , N} chooses a contribution level ci from the common strategy set
S = { 0
L
c, 1
L
c, . . . , L
L
c}, where L represents the number of levels approximating the continuous
interval [0, c], and L is assumed to be large. The maximal possible contribution is c. After
the contributions c = (c1, . . . , cN) of all players are realized, and observed by everyone, the
players automatically assign punishment points to each other. I abstract from the individual
punishment actions and analyze only the sum of punishments from all players, which is
denoted as the aggregate punishment pi(c) ≥ 0 of player i. The unspecified punishment rules
of individual players may in reality be heterogenous (e.g. Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000b), and the
aggregate punishment rule pi(·) can be interpreted as the expected punishment of player i
given the population the players are drawn from.
Although the game has two time phases, it can be seen conceptually as a one-stage game
as the players make decisions only in the contribution phase. The automatic punishment can
be modeled within the payoff function of the one-stage game.
Definition 1. The game of N players with strategy sets {Si = S}Ni=1 and the payoff function2
U i(c) = −ci − pi(c) (1)
is the punishment game.
The central assumption is that the average player is able to commit to spend only a penny
to punish free-riders:
A1:
PN
i=1 p
i
N
≤ 1.
The set of equilibria of the punishment game depends on the particular punishment rule.
With the assumption A1 being valid, one might expect an unattractive equilibrium in which
all players free-ride and punishment is ineffectively spread among all the players resulting in
no player having an incentive to contribute. However, the punishment rule proposed below
induces a game with a unique equilibrium in which all participants make high contributions:
Denote the lowest contribution among players by cl and the second lowest by csl where
cl = csl if there is more than one player with the lowest contribution. Let the punishment
rule be
pi(c) =
{
0 if ci > cl or c
i = c,
N
c+ c
L
(csl +
c
L
− ci) if ci = cl. (2)
2The payoffs from the public good are the same for all players; therefore, they do not have to be included
in the payoff function; ci is interpreted as contribution cost net of the increase of the public good. The small
cost of punishment is also not included because punishment is modeled as an automatic action not as a result
of payoff optimization.
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This punishment rule motivates the player(s) with the lowest contribution to increase
her(their) contribution(s) one level above the second lowest contribution. The marginal pun-
ishment N
c+ c
L
is chosen such that the total punishment expenditures are always at most 1 unit
per player.
Proposition 1. 1. The punishment game of N players with punishment rule (2), with the
maximal possible contribution satisfying c+ c
L
< N , and with a large number of contribution
levels L > N has a unique equilibrium with all players contributing the maximal possible
amount {c∗i = c}Ni=1.
2. The punishment rule (2) satisfies the low cost assumption A1.
Proof. 1. The player with the lowest contribution always wishes to increase her contribution
by at least c
L
because the marginal punishment she experiences N
c+ c
L
> 1 is higher than the
marginal cost of contribution. Hence, the lowest contribution level, 0, is dominated by c
L
.
After elimination of {0, 1
L
c, . . . , k
L
c}, k+1
L
c is dominated by k+2
L
c because k+1
L
c would be the
lowest contribution among non-eliminated strategies, for k = 1, . . . , L − 2. Thus, the game
can be solved by iterated elimination of dominated strategies; only c survives this process.
2. There is either only one player with the lowest contribution, and then she is the only
one being punished. The punishment is largest in this case if csl = c and cl = 0. Then the
punishment is N
c+ c
L
(c+ c
L
− 0) = N , so the cost is at most 1 unit per player.
Or there may be many players with the lowest contribution, but then csl = cl so each
punishment is N
c+ c
L
c
L
≤ 1, thus the cost per player is smaller than 1 unit.
The punishment rule (2) specifies that players punish each other even after they all have
colluded on a same contribution level. Steiner (2006) analyzes a related model in which players
cannot punish other players who contributed the same amount as themselves. Naturally,
each contribution level is a Nash equilibrium under this additional demanding assumption.
However, there exists a rule, related to (2) which guarantees that only the highest contribution
survives stochastic evolution in a sense of Ellison (2000).
3 Concluding Remarks
The possibility to punish free-riders acts like a magnifying glass on the players’ emotionality.
Although they give up only a penny voluntarily, they are able to induce each other to con-
tribute N pennies. Thus, the cooperation level increases linearly with the number of players.
This insight is confirmed by Carpenter (2004) who experimentally found a positive group size
effect even if one controls for marginal group return of contributions.
The punishment rule proposed here has a normative appeal. If a group of subjects wants to
overcome the free-riding problem but has only a limited possibility to commit to a punishment
threat, it is this rule they should choose. Of course, the punishment game requires quite a
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bit of information: all players have to be able to monitor actions of all other players. This is
realistically possible only in small groups, such as workplaces.
Sometimes the public good will be too expensive to be provided through the punishment
game discussed above. However, the game can be extended in a straightforward manner to a
second punishment stage where those who did not participate enough on punishing free-riders
could be punished. Then the players could enforce N2 contribution levels.
The model proposed here demonstrates that punishment games may be very efficient insti-
tutions even for high pecuniary stakes when emotional payoffs are small in the comparison. It
also suggests that experimental results on the punishment game do not have to be interpreted
as clear refutation of the selfishness assumption: Only minimal deviation from the assumption
is needed to explain cooperation in the punishment game. Strong reciprocity is strong in its
consequences, not in the emotional requirements of players.
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